Darwall's definition is also somewhat problematic. He says, "Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should feel (fear, say), or in some imaginedcopyofthesefeelings,whetheronecomestherebytobeconcerned…or not."Thisdefinitionhastwofeatures,whichIwouldliketoavoid.First,theappeal toimaginationseemsoverlyintellectual.Imaginationsoundslikeakindofmental actthatrequireseffortonthepartoftheimaginer.AsDarwellrecognizes,empathy initssimplestformempathyisjustemotionalcontagion:catchingtheemotionthat anotherpersonfeels (Hatfieldetal.,1994; Hoffman,2000) .Itseemsinflatedtocall contagion an imaginative act. Also, I want to resist Darwall's application of "empathy"tocaseswhereonehasafeelingthatsomeoneshouldfeel,butdoesnot feel. The problem is that this tends to blur the distinction between empathy and sympathy. Suppose I encounter a member of a cult who is delighted by the cult leader'snefariousplans.Thecultmembershouldbyafraid,butisnot.IfIfeelfear onthecultmember'sbehalf,thatisnotputtingmyselfinthecultmember'sshoes. AsIwillusetheterm,empathyrequiresakindofemotionalmimicry.
Idonotwishtoimplythatempathyisalwaysanautomaticprocess,intheway thatemotionalcontagionis.Sometimesimaginationisrequires,andsometimeswe experienceemotionsthatwethinksomeonewouldbeexperiencing,evenifwehave not seen direct evidence that the emotion is, in fact, being experienced. For example,onemightfeelempathetichopeforamarathonrunnerwhoisafewsteps behindtherunnerisfirstplace,oranxietyforthefirstplacerunner,andthesecond placerunnercatchesup.Wecanexperiencethesefeelingseveniftherunners'facial expressions reveal little more than muscular contortions associated with concentrationandphysicalexertion.Asituationcanrevealafeeling.Thecoreidea, asIwillusetheterm,isthatempathyisakindofvicariousemotion:it'sfeelingwhat one takes another person to be feeling. And the "taking" here can be a matter of automaticcontagionortheresultofacomplicatedexerciseoftheimagination.
I don't think there is anything anachronistic about this notion of empathy. I thinkithasalongtraditioninmoralphilosophy,eventhoughtheterm"empathy"is only100yearsold.TheBritishmoralists,includingDavidHumeandAdamSmith, used"sympathy"inwaythatissimilartothewayIwanttouse"empathy."Hereis Smith (1759: II.i): "Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the personprincipallyconcerned,ananalogousemotionspringsup,atthethoughtofhis situation,inthebreastofeveryattentivespectator."Myquestion,inthepagesthat follow, is whether empathy so-defined is necessary for morality. I should note again,inadvance,thattheempiricalliteraturedoesnotalwaysdistinguishbetween the constructs I have been discussing, but I do think that all the studies I discuss belowcan,byinferenceatleast,shedsomelightonempathyasdefinedhere. Thesuggestionthatempathyisnecessaryformoralitycanbeinterpretedinat leastthreedifferentways.Onemightholdtheviewthatempathyisnecessaryfor making moral judgment. One might think empathy is necessary for moral development. And one might think empathy is necessary for motivating moral conduct.Ithinkeachoftheseconjecturesisfalse.Empathyisnotnecessaryforany ofthesethings.Wecanhavemoralsystemswithoutempathy.Ofcourse,itdoesn't followdirectlythatempathyshouldbeeliminatedfrommorality.Onemightthink the modal question-Can there be morality without empathy?-and the related descriptive question-Do our moral responses depend on empathy?-are uninteresting. One might even think that the answers to these questions are obviously negative and don't need to be argued for. The interesting question, one mightthink,iswhetherempathyshouldplayanintegralroleinmorality.Inthefinal partofthispaper,Iwillofferaskepticalresponsetothisquestion,andIwilldrawof the lessons of earlier parts in making this case. I don't think the answers to the necessity claims are obvious. I think empathy looks on initial reflection like an integral part of morality. In seeing why it isn't, we will also begin to see why it shouldn'tbe.
2.IsEmpathyNecessaryforMoralJudgment?
Let's begin with the conjecture that empathy is necessary for making moral judgment.Forsimplicity,let'srestricttheaccountofjudgmentsthatareexpressed withtheterm"good"and"bad."Forexample,onemightjudgethatcharityisgood, or that wife beating is bad. According to the view under consideration these judgments depend on empathetic responses: we empathize with the positive feelings experienced by the recipients of charity and with the negative feelings of thosewhofallpreytodomesticviolence.Itistheseempatheticresponsesthatallow onetoseetheseactionsasgoodandbadrespectively.Withoutempathy,wecould mouththewordsthat"charityisgood"and"abuseisbad,"butwewouldn't speak with true understanding; we wouldn't be grasping the judgments that such sentenceshavethefunctionofexpressing.
AviewlikethiscanbeattributedtoDavidHume.Hewrites, We partake of [victims of injustice's] uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is called Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue.… [S]ympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue. (Hume, 1739: II. ii) As I read him, Hume's theory of moral judgment, can be broken down into the following claims: a virtuous action is one that intentionally brings about pleasure and a vicious action is one that intentionally brings about pain; when we contemplatethepleasureorpainofanotherperson,wefeelempathy(whatHume calls"sympathy");ourempatheticresponsetotherecipientsofvirtuousandvicious actionsarousesinusfeelingsofapprobationanddisapprobation,respectively;these feelings of approbation and disapprobation constitute our judgments that something is morally good or bad. On this interpretation, empathy is an essential precursor to moral judgment. If we had no empathy, the pain brought about by a vicious action would leave us cold, and no disapprobation would follow. Thus empathy,whilenotacomponentofmoraljudgment,isaprecondition.
WhetherornotthisisanaccuratereadingofHume,theaccounthasaninitial ring of plausibility. It is plausible that empathy plays an epistemological role, leadingustohavenegativeregardforthoseactionsthatharmpeopleandpositive regard for those actions that help. If moral judgment consists in a certain kind of negative or positive regard, empathy looks like it might be fundamental to moral cognition.Butcloseanalysisseversthislink.
First,considercaseswheredeontologicalconsiderationsoverruleutilitarian principles. For example, one might judge that it is bad to kill an innocent person even if his vital organs could be used to save five others who desperately need transplants.Here,arguably,wefeelcumulativelymoreempathyforthefivepeople inneedthanfortheonehealthyperson,butourmoraljudgmentdoesnottrackthat empatheticresponse.Second,considerthemoraljudgmentsonemightissuefrom behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance; you might decide it's good to distribute resourcestotheneedybecauseyoumightbeneedy.Herethereisnoempathyfor the needy, but rather concern for the self. Third, while on the topic of the self, consider cases in which you yourself are the victim of a moral transgression. You judge that you've been wronged, but you don't thereby empathize with yourself, whatever that would mean. Fourth, consider cases in which there is no salient victim. One can judge that it would be wrong to evade taxes or steal from a departmentstore,forinstance,withoutdwellingfirstonthesufferingofthosewho would be harmed. Fifth, there are victimless transgressions, such as necrophilia, consensual sibling incest, destruction of (unpopulated) places in the environment, or desecration of a grave of someone who has no surviving relative. Empathy makes no sense in these cases. As a descriptive claim it seems wrong to suppose thatempathyisapreconditionformoraljudgment.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that other emotions are sufficient for moraljudgmentevenwhenempathyisabsent.RecalltheHumeanmodelonwhich empathy leads to disapprobation. A simpler alternative would say that disapprobationcanarisedirectlyuponconsiderationofvariouskindsofaction.To see this, it's helpful to have a firmer idea of what disapprobation is. Elsewhere, I offer the following analysis (Prinz, 2007: chap. 2 ; drawing on Rozin et al., 1999) . Disapprobation, I claim, is a sentiment, rather than an emotion. Sentiments are dispositionstohaveemotions.Disapprobationisadispositiontohaveemotionsof blame towards self and others. If I have a sentiment of disapprobation towards stealing, I am disposed to have bad feelings towards my self if I steal and bad feelingstowardsyouifyousteal.Thefeelingsdependonthekindofactionunder consideration. Stealing is a crime against a person, and when such actions are performed by others they elicit anger, and when performed by the self, they elicit guilt. In contrast there are crimes against nature: such as necrophilia, incest, or bestiality. In these cases, the dominant emotional response is disgust, when the action is performed by another, and shame if we perform or even consider performing such an action ourselves. In addition, there are crimes against community, such as the violation of public trust, which tend to elicit contempt or somekind ofselfloathing. On any givenoccasion,when I judge that somethingis wrong, that judgment token derives from a sentiment, and consists in the appropriateemotionalresponse. Ifthisisright,thenempathyisnotanecessaryprecursortomoraljudgment. I emphasize this point, because it is sometimes presumed that sentimentalist theories of moral judgment must be empathy-based theories. The tradition that includesDavidHumeandAdamSmithhasplacedempathyinacentralplace.Itis even sometimes suggested that empathy is the fundamental affective response involvedinmoraljudgment.Thatisamistake.Theemotionsjustmentionedhave been demonstrated to play a major part in morality. One can advance a sentimentalisttheorybasedonsuchemotionsasangerandguilt,whilegivingonly marginal import to empathy. Empathy may help us come to the conclusion that a particularactioniswrongonaparticularoccasion,butithardlyseemsnecessaryfor thatpurpose.
3.IsEmpathyNecessaryforMoralDevelopment?
TheHumeantheoryofmoraljudgmentthatI'vejustbeendiscussingisasynchronic theory:it'satheoryofwhatmoraljudgmentsarelikewhenwemakethemhereand now. I argued that the theory is false; we often make moral judgments in the absence of empathetic responses. But this conclusion is consistent with the possibilitythatempathyplaysadiachronicrole:emotionsmaybenecessaryforthe developmentofthecapacitytomakemoraljudgmentsinthefirstplace.
Theideathatempathyplaysaroleinmoraldevelopmenthasbeenpursued by some developmental psychologists. The emergence of empathy has been extensivelyinvestigated,andsomedevelopmentalistsspeculatethatempathyplays anessentialroleindevelopingasenseofmorality (Hoffman,2000) .Conceptually, the idea has much appeal. Morality centrally regards the regulation of behavior towards others, and one can acquire a concern for others' well-being by empathizing with them. If a child were not empathetic, she could not fully appreciatehowheractionsaffectedothers,and,withoutthat,shemightnotcometo appreciatewhenheractionswerewrong.
It'ssomewhatdifficulttofindevidencefordevelopmentalhypothesesofthis kind.Moststudiesofnormallydevelopingchildrenmeasurerelationshipsbetween empathyandmorallyrelevantbehaviorssuchasaggressionandhelpingbehaviors (Eisenberg et al., 2006) . But what's really at issue here is whether empathy gives risetothecapacitytomakemoraljudgments.Studiesdoshowthatchildrenengage inempatheticreasoningwhenmakingmoraljudgments (Eisenberg-Berg,1979 ),but theydonotshowthatempathyisessentialtomoraljudgment.Evenahighpositive correlation between empathy and healthy moral judgments would not speak directly to the necessity thesis. Such correlations would not show that, without empathy,acapacityformoraljudgmentwouldnotbeacquired.
To assess the necessity thesis, researchers must consider pathological populations. They must identify people who lack empathy and see whether they lack moral competence as a result. Blair (1995) takes on precisely this challenge. His study investigates morality in psychopaths. Lack of empathy is a diagnostic criterion for psychopathy (Hare, 1991) , and Blair shows that psychopaths also sufferfromaprofounddeficitinmoralcompetence.Inparticular,theydonotdraw adistinctionbetweenmoralrules(e.g.,don'thitpeople)andconventionalrules(e.g., rules about what clothing to wear in school). Blair concludes that psychopaths' failuretodrawthisdistinctionindicatesthattheydonotcomprehendtheessenceof moral rules. When they say that something is "morally wrong," they don't really understand what these words mean. Blair speculates that this failure is a direct result of the empathy deficit. His developmental modelsgoes roughly like this: normallydevelopingchildrenhaveaninnatetendencytoempathizewithobserved distress. So, if one child causes another child to cry, the offending child will catch theobservedemotionandfeelbadly.Thisbadfeelingservesasaninhibitionsignal that causes her to cease the actions that are causing the distress and to associate bad feelings with that kind of action in the future. Blair conceptualizes this as a violenceinhibitionmechanism,akintowhatweobserveinnon-humananimals.If twodogsarefighting,thestrongerwillstopaggressingwhentheweakerbearsits throat.Blairthinksthatviolenceinhibitionismediatedbyempatheticdistress,and, in humans, distress becomes associated with moral rules, but not conventional rules, because conventional violations do not cause distress. Normally developing children can distinguish moral and conventional rules because the former are emotionally grounded. Absent emotional grounding, the distinction would not be drawn. Absent empathy, moral rules would never acquire emotional grounding. Thus, Blair concludes, empathy is necessary for moral development. He does not, however assume that empathy arises whenever moral judgments are made in adulthood.Oncenegativeemotionshavebeenassociatedwithanactiontype,one canrecognizeitswrongnesswithoutcontemplatinganyoneindistress.
Blair's account can be challenged in various ways. First, it is not clear that there is a violence inhibition mechanism. The status of such a mechanism is controversial in ethology and has not been established in human beings. Second, manyofthemoralruleswelearninvolvenon-violentbehaviors,suchasstealingor sexual impropriety. One of the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy is "criminal versatility,"whichsuggeststhatpsychopathydoesnotstemfromaspecificdeficitin violenceinhibition,asBlair'smodelsuggests.Third,thereisevidencethatnormally developing children draw the moral/conventional distinction well before they associate empathy with morality. Smetana and Braeges (1990) show sensitivity to the distinction before the third birthday, and Eisenberg-Berg (1979) shows that empathy does not enter actively into moral reasoning until high school. Fourth, thereareotherexplanationsofwhypsychopathshavedeficitsinbothempathyand moral competence: these two deficits may arise from a third cause. In particular, psychopathssufferfromamoregeneraldeficitinmoralemotions."ShallowAffect" isoneofthediagnosticcriteriaonpsychopathy. Here'showCleckley(1941 /1976 putsit:
Vexation, spite, quick and labile flashes of quasi-affection, peevish resentment, shallow moods of self-pity, puerile attitudes of vanity, and absurdandshowyposesofindignationareallwithinhisemotionalscaleand are freely soundedas the circumstances of life play upon him. But mature, wholehearted anger, true or consistent indignation, honest, solid grief, sustainingpride,deepjoy,andgenuinedespairarereactionsnotlikelytobe foundwithinthisscale. Psychopaths are also poor at recognizing emotions, especially fear and sadnessand recognition deficits are known to be correlated with deficits in emotional experience (Blairetal.,2002) .Theseaffectiveabnormalitiescouldexplainboththe lowlevelsofempathyinpsychopathsandthelackofmoralcompetence.Empathy requiresadispositiontoexperienceemotionsappropriateforanotherperson,anda person with shallow affect and poor emotional recognition will have a diminished capacity forempathy asa result.Theemotiondeficitwill alsomake an individual comparatively insensitive to common methods of moral education: they will be relativelyindifferenttopunishment,becausetheyhavelowlevelsoffear,andthey willbeunmovedbylovewithdrawal,becausetheyhavelowlevelsofsadness.They will also have a diminished capacity for emotions like guilt, which seem to have sadness as a component (Prinz, 2004) , and moral anger. So psychopaths will lack emotions that facilitate moral education as well as the emotions that constitute moraljudgmentsonthemodelthatIoutlinedintheprevioussection.Therefore,the deficitinmoralcompetencecanbeexplainedwithoutappealtotheempathydeficit.
Given the availability of this alternative explanation, Blair's hypothesis that empathy is necessary for moral development is in need of further support. And given the fact the empathy enters into moral discourse fairly late in development, the alternative explanation is to be preferred. Young children are empathetic, but thereislittleevidencelinkingtheirempatheticresponsestotheircapacitytomake moraljudgments.Atbest,empatheticresponsesinyoungchildrenhavebeenlinked tomoralbehavior.But,evenhere,thelinksarequitelimited,aswewillnowsee.
4.IsEmpathyNecessaryforMoralConduct?
So far I have been arguing that empathy is not necessary for making moral judgments,eithersynchronicallyordiachronically.Stillitmightbeconjecturedthat empathy is necessary in another way: it might be necessary for moral motivation. Let'ssupposesomeonearrivesatthejudgmentthatitwouldbegoodtogivecharity. Itmightbepossibletomakesuchajudgmentwithoutfeelingmotivatedtoactonit. Perhaps empathy with the recipients of charity is what converts moral judgment into moral conduct. Or suppose someone comes to think it's bad to abuse his spouse. Without empathy for her, he might continue to be abusive. It seems plausible, on the face of it, that empathy is the key to converting judgment into action.
There are good reasons to resist this picture. First of all, on the account I sketchedabove,moraljudgmentshaveanemotionalbasis.Tokenmoraljudgments containemotionssuchasanger,disgust,guilt,andshame.Emotionsaremotivating states,andeachofthesemoralemotionshasabehavioralprofile.Angerpromotes aggression, disgust promotes withdrawal, guilt promotes reparation, and shame promotes self-concealment. More generally, these emotions are negatively valenced,andnegativeemotionsarethingsweworktoavoid (Prinz,2004) .Ifwe anticipatethatanactionwillmakeusfeelguilty,wewillbetherebyinclinedtoavoid that action. The guilt-prone would-be wife beater might learn to overcome his abusiverages.Itfollowsfromthisthatmoraljudgments,whichcontainemotions, areintrinsicallymotivatingstates.Apersonwhojudgesthatstealingiswrong,for example, will be motivated to resist the urge to steal, even when it would be easy andlucrative.Suchapersonwillalsobemotivatedtopreventothersfromstealing; for example, those who think stealing is wrong might report a shoplifter to store clerkeventhoughthisinterventioncarriessomeriskandnodirectreward.Andthis isjusthalfthestory.Ihavebeenfocusingondisapprobation.Theremayalsobea suite of positive emotions associated with moral approbation. Good behavior by others elicits admiration and gratitude, as remarked above. And the person who engages in good behavior feels pride or gratification. Anticipating these good feelings can lead to good actions. On this view, moral judgments have plenty of motivationalimpactintheabsenceofempathy.
Moreover, the emotions involved in approbation and disapprobation may have greater motivational force than the emotions associated with empathy. That empathyleadstoactionisactuallyquiteweak.Let'sbeginbyconsideringresearch on empathy in children. In an extensive meta-analysis, Underwood and Moore (1982) show that there is a positive correlation between emotion attribution and prosocial behavior in children, but no correlation between empathy and prosocial behavior. Indeed, a number of the studies show negative correlations between empathyandaltruism.Criticshaveworriedthatthestudiescontainedinthismetaanalysisareflawedbecausetheymeasureempathybyselfreport(thoughmeasures include non-verbal self report, such as asking children to point out a facial expression corresponding to how they feel). In lieu of self report, Eisenberg et al. (1989) used observers' reports and found that prosocial behavior is positively correlated with "concerned attention" in children. A child who wrinkles her brow when watching someone in need, is more likely to help. But no correlation was foundfor"sharedemotion."Empathyessentiallyinvolvessharingemotions,sothis resultsuggeststhatempathydoesnotcontributetoprosocialbehaviorinchildren. Attentionandconcernmatter,butempathydoesnot.
Thesituationisalittlelessbleakwhenitcomestoadults.Therearemodest correlationsinadultsbetweenprosocialbehaviorandsharedsadness (Eisenberget al., 1989) . Adults who looked sad while watching a film about a woman whose children had been in a car wreck were slightly more likely to offer to help that woman with yard work when, later in the experiment, they read a letter from her requestinghelp.Butthisstudydoesnotestablishthatempathy,ingeneral,relates toaltruism,becauseitisrestrictedtosadness.Andcuriously,thereisnocorrelation between expressions of sadness while reading the letter, and the decision to help, whichismadejustafterwards.So,empatheticsadnessisnottheimmediatecauseof helpfulness.Moreover,manypeoplewhoshowednosharedemotionswerehelpful as well, so the study provides no evidence for the conclusion that empathy is necessaryformoralconduct.
The Eisenberg et al. (1989) study is typical. A meta-analysis shows that empathy only weakly correlated with prosocial behavior (Neuberg, et al., 1997) . More strikingly, the correlation appears only when there is little cost. If someone hastodosomethingaseasyascrossingastreettohelpsomeoneinneed,theyare notespeciallylikelyto,andthosewhoareempatheticshownogreatertendencyto helpinsuchcircumstancesthanthosewhoarenot.Nowitmustbenotedthatmost of the research summarized in this meta-analysis does not carefully distinguish between empathy, sympathy, and concern. One can't be sure that the studies in question are ones in which the participants actually experienced emotions akin to those of the people they were in a position to help. But I think the failure to find strong motivation associated with the various forms of fellow-feeling, provides evidence for thinking that empathy is not a great motivator. It's overwhelmingly likelythatempathyisexperiencedbyparticipantsinmanyofthestudiesreviewed byNeuberg.Moreover,thereareindependentreasonsforpredictingthatempathy should have limited motivational force. First, an emotion caught from another personislikelytobefarweakerthananemotionthatoriginatesinoneself.Second, when we consider others in need, the emotions we are likely to catch are things suchassadness,misery,anddistress.Theseemotionsmaynotbegreatmotivators. Misery might even promote social withdrawal. So there is little reason to think empathy,definedintermsofvicariousemotions,woulddomuchtomakeuswork onbehalfofpeopleinneed.
Themeagereffectsofempathyaregreatlyovershadowedbyotheremotions. Consider,forexample,positiveaffect.Above,Isuggestedthefeelingsofapprobation arepositiveandpositiveemotionsmayhelptoexplainwhypeopledogoodthings. Empirical support for this hypothesis comes from the large literature on positive emotions and helping (Carlson et al., 1988) . For example, Isen and Levin (1982) induced positive affect by planting a dime in a neighborhood phone booth. They thenwatchedtoseewhetherthepersonwhofoundthedimewouldhelpapasserby who dropped some papers. Among those who found the dime, 87.5% helped. Among those in the control condition, where there was no dime planted in the phone, only 4% helped. Other studies have not always shown such a large effect size,buttheydotendtoconfirmthatasmalldoseofhappinessseemstopromote considerable altruism. This is often true even when the altruism is costly. For example, Weyant (1978) found that people who are made to feel good by being given an easy test to solve are almost twice as likely, when compared to neutral controls, to volunteer for a charity that requires going door to door collecting donation.Happinessseemstomakeusworkforpeopleinneed.Thisconclusionis embarrassingforthosewhothinkempathyiscrucialforaltruismbecausevicarious distresspresumablyhasanegativecorrelationwithpositivehappiness.Itcouldbe thatvicariousdistressreduceshelpfulnessbydiminishingpositiveaffect. Thereisalsoevidencethattheemotionsassociatedwithdisapprobationare highlymotivating.Consideranger.Lerneretal.(1998)showedsubjectsemotioninducing film clips and then probed their attitudes towards punishment on unrelated vignettes. Subjects who watched anger inducing films recommended harsher punishments than those in the control condition. Studies using economic gameshaveshownthat,whenangry,peopleareevenwillingtopaysignificantcosts to punish those who fail to cooperate (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) . This contrasts strikingly with empathy, which does not motivate moral behavior when there are significantcosts.Guiltisalsoagreatmotivator.InastudybyCarlsmithandGross (1969) subjects were asked to make some fundraising phone calls for a charity organizationaftertheyadministeredshockstoaninnocentperson.Thesesubjects made morethan threetimes as many fundraisingcalls as the subjects in a control conditionwherenoshockswereadministered.
These studies suggest that empathy is not a major player when it comes to moral motivation. Its contribution is negligible in children, modest in adults, and non-existentwhencostsaresignificant.Otheremotions,includingthoseassociated with approbation and disapprobation appear to have much greater impact. Thus, thehypothesisthatempathyisnecessaryformoralconduct-orevenimportantenjoyslittlesupport.
5.ShouldweCultivateAnEmpathyBasedMorality?
At this point, we can draw an initial conclusion: empathy probably isn't necessary for morality in any of the senses that I have been considering. But that does not meanempathyplaysnoroleinmorality.Presumablyitdoes.Presumablyempathy can induce a moral judgment, factor into moral development, and facilitate moral motivation.Itprobablyplaysalltheserolestosomedegree.Ihavetriedtosuggest thatthedegreemaybelimited.Thatisadescriptiveclaim.Onemightthinkthat thisclaimisuninterestingfromtheperspectiveofethicaltheory.Thequestionthat reallymattersinnormative,notdescriptive.Evenifempathydoesnotplayacentral role in morality, perhaps it could. Should we, then, try to increase the role for empathy in morality? Should we cultivate moral systems that are based on empathy?
Toaddressthisquestion,Iwanttobeginbyreflectingonwhatanempathybased moral system might look like. To keep this plausible, I will reflect on some actual moral systems that seem to place empathy in a position of prominence. So far,inthisdiscussionIhavetalkedaboutmorality(oreven"ourmorality")asifit were just one thing. In reality, there are many different moralities-different systems of moral rules that have been internalized by different groups of people. These may vary in the degree to which they emphasize morality. Looking at empathetic moralities may help us address the normative question under considerationhere.Iwillconsiderthreeexamples.
Let's begin by looking at moral values in collectivist cultures. Collectivism canbedefinedas:"asocialpatternconsistingofcloselylinkedindividualswhosee themselves as parts of one or more collectives…; are primarily motivated by the normsof…thosecollectives [and] emphasizetheirconnectednesstoothermembers ofthosecollectives" (Triandis,1995:2) .CollectivistculturescanbefoundintheFar East, South Asia, South America, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. The cultures in these regions also differ from each other, but their members tend to share a similar tendency to prioritize group membership in their self-conceptions andvalues.Individualistcultures,likethosefoundintheUnitedStatesandWestern Europe, are comprised by "loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collective [and] are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contract they have established with others" (ibid). In short, collectivists tend to value group cohesion above all, and individualists value autonomy.
Collectivism,byitsverynature,mayplacemoreemphasisonempathythan individualism. Consider child-rearing practices in Japan. Greenfield and Suzuki (1998) found that, in contrast to Americans, Japanese parents had more contact withtheirchildren,weremoreindulgentandcalming,andintroducedtoysintoplay as opportunities for sharing, rather than, say, skill mastery. American parenting practices foster independence and probably decrease children's tendency to view each other empathetically, promoting interpersonal relationships that are more likely to be competitive than collaborative. If children view each other as competitors over toys, rather than sharing partners, they may be less likely to respondtoeachotherempathetically.Theemphasisongroupsalsoshapesmoral values in collectivist cultures. In many, strong emphasis is placed on respect for parentsandfamily.Thewrongdoingsoftheindividualareseenasreflectingonthe groupinawaythatsuggestsdeepempatheticconnections.Collectivistsalsodiffer from individualists when it comes to questions of distributive justice. Leung and Bond(1984) ConsiderasecondexamplethatcanbefoundwithinWesternculture.Oneof the most salient moral divides in the West is between liberals and conservatives. Thesepoliticalorientationscanbeconceptualizedasmoralvaluesystems,andthe differencesarequitepronounced. Lakoff(2002) triestocapturethisbysuggesting thatliberalsandconservativesbothbasetheirviewsabouthowtorunasocietyon stereotypical ideals for how to run a household, but they draw on different stereotypes. For conservatives, the ideal is a household run by an authoritarian father, and for liberals it's a nurturing mother. This translates into the following moral frameworks. Conservatives value self-reliance and self-discipline; they emphasizetheimportanceofpunishmentandreward;theystrivetoprotectsociety from evil; and to uphold "moral order." Liberals, in contrast, want to help the helpless;protectthevulnerable;andpromotefulfillment.Ifsomeonetransgresses a norm, it is not construed as evil, but rather as the result of bad influences, or confusion, or perhaps even a botched attempt at self-expression. The wrong doer should be helped or reformed. For conservatives, there is little tolerance for transgression;threestrikesandyou'reout.Lakoffcapturestheliberalvaluesystem by saying that for liberals, morality is empathy. The construct of empathy is essential. Liberals try to empathize with both victims and transgressors, and, instead of dividing the world into good and evil, they try to put themselves in the shoesof people on both sidesof everydivide. In foreign policy, conservativessee members of countries that are hostile to their homeland as enemies, where as liberals see them as freedom fighters trying to protect themselves against aggression. In domestic policy, liberals support social welfare programs to help peopleinneed.Conservativestendtobelessempathetic,andtheythinktheneedy shouldpullthemselvestogetherandsolvetheirownproblemsratherthanlooking forhandouts.
As a final example, consider gender differences in morality. Though highly controversial, there is evidence that men and women have different moral orientationsthatderivefromthedifferentrolestheyplayandexperiencestheyhave ingenderstratifiedsocieties. Gilligan(1982) famouslyarguedthatwomentendto have an ethics based on care, rather than rigid principles. The empirical case for Gilligan's thesis has been mixed, especially when using traditional study methods, whichmeasuregenderdifferencesinreasoningstyle. Walker(1984) foundsupport for Gilligan in only 8 out of 108 Kohlberg-styles studies. Jaffee and Hyde (2000) foundmoreconsistentsupportforGilliganintheirmorerecentmeta-analysis,but theoverallcontributionofgenderthattheyreportisrelativelysmall.Onereason for these modest results may be that traditional tests exhibit a male gender bias, insofarastheyaskpeopletoarguefortheirmoraldecisionsratherthanprobingthe underlying feelings. When feelings are examined, differences emerge. First of all, there is strong evidence that women are more prone to empathy than men (EisenbergandLennon,1983) .Andthisseemstohavesignificantimplicationsfor morality. Gibbs et al. (1984) found that women made twice as many appeals to empathyinmoraljustification(53%vs.27%).Singeretal. (2006)foundevidence forthisinthebrain:whenmenwatchedawrongdoergettingshocked,theyshowed activity in reward centers of the brains (the nucleus accumbens), whereas women showednorewardactivityandsignificantactivationinpaincenters,suggestingan empatheticpainresponse.Correspondingly,womenwerelessthanhalfaslikelyto desirerevenge.Finally,instudiesoftrolleydilemmas, Mikhail(2002) foundwomen twice as likely to say it is impermissible to sacrifice one life in order to save five peopleinharm'sway(byswitchingarunawaytrolleyontoanalternatetrack). Thesedifferencesarequitedramatic,and,ineachcase,theysuggestamoral orientationthatismoreempathetic.Beforemovingon,Imustaddacautionarynote againstessentialism.Iamnotsuggestingthatgenderdifferenceshaveabiological basis. There is evidence that parents socialize their female children to be more empathetic. Parents use emotion words twice as frequently when talking to their daughters (Adams, 1995) , and the observed differences seem to correlate better with gender roles than with biological sex (Karniol et al. 1998 ). The gender differencesinempathyalsoseemtobemotivationalinnature,anddisappearunder some testing conditions (Klein and Hodges, 2001 ). There are a number of social factorsthatmightpromoteanempathy-basedorientationinwomen.First,women have lower status than men in male dominant societies, and sensitivity to the emotions of others may be a good coping strategy under such circumstances. Second, because women are often subordinate to men, they may develop more concern for the underdog because they can relate. Third, because women play a disproportionate role in childcare, they may develop more nurturance skills. And finally,lackofemploymentopportunitiesmayleadtohigherdegreesofcollectivism: individualism is fuelled by competitive marketplaces. The result of these factors seems to be that women are more skilled than men at taking the perspective of others,andthisinformswomen'smoraloutlook.
These examples help us see how moral systems can vary in the degree to which they emphasize empathy. They also help us see why a more empathetic approach might seem desirable. Given the sociology of academia, most readers of this chapter are probably disposed to think that collectivism, liberalism, and feminismaregoodthings.Ifcollectivist,liberal,andfeministapproachestomorality all emphasize empathy, that's an indication that empathy might be something we shouldactivelypromote.Ithinkthatwouldbeahastyconclusion.
To see this, it is important to notice that collectivism, liberalism, and empathy-basedfeministethicsallhavedarksides.Collectivismhasbeenusedasa tool to promotedangerouskinds of group thinking and intolerance. In Japan, it is not uncommon for groups of school kids to beat up peers who are perceived as different.Bullying(orIjime)iswidespreadandoftentargetsthosewhodonotfitin. More disturbingly, Pol Pot exploited collectivist thinking when he got the Khmer Rouge to kill dissenters and intellectuals. Pol Pot made explicit use of collectivist rhetoric and collectivist ideology helped legitimate his campaigns (see e.g. Valentino, 1995: 135f.) . Collectivist thinking has also been implicated in suicide bombers. Atran(2003) arguesthatsuicidebombersarebondingbya"fictive"sense of kinship, which allows them to lay down their lives for a group. Arguably, empathy plays a role in establishing the bonds that allow for such collective behaviors.
Liberalismmayhaveadarksidetoo.Thepoliticsofempathytendstotreat thevictimsofinequalitywithouttargetingrootcauses.Socialwelfaredoeseasethe suffering of the poor, but it does not undo the cycles of intergenerational poverty. Poverty is often inherited and social stratification remains in a place across generations.Thepoliticsofempathyisalsosubjecttoempatheticbiases(onwhich more below); policy makers empathize more with some people than with others. Socialwelfareprogramswereintroducedtohelpwhitemothers,notpeopleofcolor, thoughnowpeopleofcoloraremorelikelytobeonwelfare(relativetopopulation size)andmorelikelytostayonwelfareintergenerationallybecausetheexistenceof such programs promotes a kind of complacency that leads liberal attention away fromthechallengingproblemsassociatedwithbiasinlabormarketsandthesocial capital deficits that result from ghettoization. Ironically, the stigmatization makes the recipients of welfare less easy to empathize with and thus more likely to be blamed for economic hardships. The relevant question here is what kinds of emotional responses would help promote a campaign against the root causes of economic injustice, rather than merely offering the (very helpful) support to its victims?Theanswerprobablyisn'tempathy,butratherindignation.
A similar point pertains to any brand of feminist ethics that promotes empathyasthecentralmoralconstruct.Thefactthatwomenaremoreempathetic thanmenis,Isuggested,aconsequenceofsocialrolesthatemergeunderconditions ofmaledominance.Thisraisesanurgentquestion:istheempatheticorientationin women'smoralityausefultoolforliberationordoesitratherservetosustainthe inequalityfromwhichitsprings?Therearereasonstosuspectthatthelattermight betruetosomeextent.Liberation,itseems,requiresoutrage:totalintoleranceto oppression and a correspondingly aggressive pursuit of change. If "aggression" is treated as a bad (and phallocentric) word, and replaced by a moral stance that is predominantlyempathetic,inactionmayresult.Iftheemotionalresponsetogender inequality is to feel empathic sadness for those who are adversely affected, the resultinginterventionsmaybelimitedbecausesadnesstendstoreducemotivation, rather than increasing it. If, in contrast, critics of inequality, get angry or "uppity" (as the anger of the oppressed is called), more radical change may be actively sought. A feminist morality bent on liberation should not be an empathy-based morality if that label is meant to describe a morality that makes empathy into the primaryemotionalresource.Anoutrage-basedmoralitymightbemoreeffective.
The point of these remarks has not been to criticize empathy so much as bring out some limitations. When we look for moral systems that have placed greateremphasisonempathy,wecanseethatempathyisadouble-edgedsword:it can promote compliance and complacency. Of course, empathy can also promote moralconcern,andthat,onemightthink,isagoodthing.Buttherearesomemore generalproblemswithempathythatshouldraisedoubtsaboutitsroleasacentral moralemotion.ManyoftheseproblemsalsoapplytosympathyandtowhatBatson calls "empathetic concern." Indeed, some of the studies I will mention now were done with one of these other constructs in mind, though I think they apply to empathyaswell.WhatIofferhereisalaundrylistofworriesaboutempathy,some ofwhichIhavealreadymentioned.Iinvitethereadertoreflectonwhetherthese worriesthreatenallspeciesoffellow-feeling.
First,aswehaveseen,empathyisnotverymotivating.Soevenifempathy elevates the level of concern, it doesn't do so in a way that guarantees action on behalfofthoseinneed.Vicariousangeralsoconstitutesaspeciesofconcern,andit maybeabettermotivator.
Second, empathy may lead to preferential treatment. Batson et al. (1995) presented subjects with a vignette about a woman, Sheri, awaiting medical treatment, and then asked them if they wanted to move Sheri to the top of the waitlist,aboveotherswhoweremoreneedy.Inthecontrolcondition,themajority declinedtomoreherupthelist,butinaconditionwheretheywereencouragedto empathizewithSheri,theyoverwhelminglyelectedtomoveherupattheexpenseof thoseingreaterneed.
Third, empathy may be subject to unfortunate biases including cuteness effects. Batson et al. (2005) found that college students were more likely to feel empatheticconcernforchildren,dogs,andpuppiesthantheirownpeers.Batson's notion of empathetic concern is not equivalent to empathy, as I am defining it, because it does not require feeling what the object of empathy should feel, but I thinkcutenesseffectswouldalsoariseforempathy.Forexample,I'dwagerthatwe wouldfeelmorevicarioussadnessforadyingmousethanarat,andmorevicarious fear for a frog crossing the highway than a lizard. It has also been found that empathetic accuracy-which includes the ability to identify someone else's emotions,and,thus,perhaps,tomirrorthem-increaseswhenthetargetisviewed asattractive (Ickesetal.,1990) .
Fourth, empathy can be easily manipulated. Tsoudis (2002) found that in mocktrials,ajury'srecommendationforsentencingcouldbeinfluencedbywhether ornot victimsand defendantsexpressedemotions. When sadnesswas expressed, empathywentup,ingratiatingthejurytotheonewhoexpressedthesadness.Sad victimsevokedharshersentences,andsaddefendantsgotlightersentences.
Fifth, empathy can be highly selective. Think about the experience of watching a boxing match. You might feel great empathy when the boxer you are rooting for takes a blow, but great delight when he delivers an equally punishing blowtohisopponent.Inbothcases,youarewatchingthesameviolentact,butthe allocation of empathy can vary dramatically as a function of morally arbitrary concernsaboutwhowillwin.
Sixth,empathyispronetoin-groupbiases.Wehavemoreempathyforthose we see as like us, and that empathy is also more efficacious. Brown et al. (2006) foundthatwhenviewingpicturesoffaces,peopleshowmoreempatheticresponses, asmeasuredbyphysiologyandselfreport,formembersofthesameethnicgroup. Stürmer et al. (2005) found that empathy leads to helping only in cases when the person in need is a member of the in-group. In one of their studies, participants learn about someone who may have contracted hepatitis and their willingness to offersupport,suchastalkingonthephone,dependedonbothempathyandwhether thepersonhadthesamesexualorientationastheparticipant.Thisstrongin-group biasdoesn'tshowupineverystudy,butevenifonlyoccasional,itissomethingthat defendersofempathyshouldworryabout.
Seventh,empathyissubjecttoproximityeffects.Therewasanoutpouringof support for the Katrina hurricane victims in the United States in 2005, and passionate expressions of empathy for the victims is still frequently expressed in publicdiscoursehere.Thedeathtollwas1,836.Ayearlater,anearthquakeinJava killed 5,782 people and there was little news coverage in comparison. I would venture to guess that few Americans remember the incident. Nor is there much discussion of the Indian Ocean Tsunami a year before Katrina. People recall that event, but discuss it here with less pathos than Katrina. This despite the fact that the death toll was 315,000. It might be suggested that Katrina continues to command our attention because the bungled relief efforts draw attention to the nation's ongoing problems with racial prejudice, and, to that extent, the disaster remains relevant after the fact. But American prejudice can also be implicated in ourfailuretopreventtheattemptedgenocideinRwanda,inwhichatleast800,000 Tutsiswerekilled.That'smorethat435timesthedeathtollinKatrina,butpublic discussionoftheeventsisrarehere.Thebestexplanationisthatempathyincreases forthosewhoarenearby,culturallyandgeographically.
Eighth,empathyissubjecttosalienceeffects.Naturaldisastersandwarsare salient,newsworthyevents.Thehappenduringtemporarycircumscribedperiods in localized areas, and can be characterized in narrative terms (preconditions, the catastrophe, the aftermath). Other causes of mass death are less salient, because theyaretooconstantanddiffusetobenewsitems.Thisisthecasewithhungerand disease.Toputsomedepressingnumbersontheproblemconsiderthefollowing: malaria is estimated to kill between 1.5 and 4 million people a year; tuberculosis kills2million;andAIDSkills2.8million.Hungeristhebiggestkillerofall:9million die each year for lack of food. That means that every single day, there are 24 Katrinas.10.5timesthenumberofpeoplewhodiedinKatrinadieeachdayfrom preventablediseases,and13.5timesasmanypeoplediefrommalnutrition.These deathsarenotsalient,sotheyinducelittleempathy.
In sum, empathy has serious shortcomings. It is not especially motivating anditissovulnerabletobiasandselectivitythatitfailstoprovideabroadumbrella of moral concern. A morality based on empathy would lead to preferential treatmentandgrotesquecrimesofomission.Empathymaydosomepositivework inmoralcognition,suchaspromoteconcernforthenearanddear,butitshouldnot bethecentralmotivationalcomponentofamoralsystem.
6.ConcludingQuestion:CanWeImproveEmpathy?
The limitations of empathy can be summarized by saying that empathy lacks motivationalstrengthandtendstobehighlyselective.Defendersofempathymight argue that these limitations can be overcome. Perhaps we should try to improve empathy rather than giving it a marginal role. Perhaps an improved capacity for empathywouldbeworthyofexaltingtoacentralpositionismorality.
An improved empathy would require two fundamental changes. First, we would need to do something to give empathy more force in promoting action: a mechanism of motivation. One possibility would be to train ourselves to combine empathy with the emotions that constitute the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. For example, we might combine empathy with a pride, so that whenwehelpthoseinneedwefeelgoodaboutourselves.Weknowthatpeoplewill work to attain positive, and recent research suggests that pride has motivational forceaboveandbeyondthefactthatitfeelsgood,evenwhenthereisconsiderable cost (Williams and Desteno, 2008) . Empathy ca also be combined with various formsofdisapprobation.Forexample,whenwelearnaboutpeoplewhohavebeen victimsofinjustice,wecouldcombineempathywithindignation.Weknowpeople will incur considerable costs when they are angry. If we got angry when we empathizedwiththosewhohavebeenharmed,wemightbemorelikelytoworkon theirbehalf.Second,wewouldneedtoovercometheselectivenatureofempathyby devisingawaytomakeusempathizewithabroaderrangeofpeople:amechanism for determining moral considerability. For example, we might adopt a Kantian approach to cultivate a cosmopolitan outlook that exposed proximity biases and made distant strangers seem more worthy of moral concern. Or we might try to adopt the position of an ideal observer, in the spirit of Adam Smith, when making moraljudgments.Ofcourse,itisdifficulttoadoptacosmopolitanperspective,and even more difficult to be an ideal observer. Therefore, my own recommendation wouldactuallybetomakeuseofalessdemandingalternativestothesetwo.Ifwe focusourmoraljudgmentsontypesofactions(stealing,torture,rape,etc.)andmake aneffortnottoreflectonthespecificvictims,whenmaybeabletoachieveakindof impartialitythatdoesnotrequiretheepistemicavailabilityofatrulycosmopolitan outlookoratrulyidealpositionofobservation.Icannotfleshouttheideahere,but thebasicideaisthatwemakeaconcertedefforttofocusmoralreflectiononwhat hashappenednotonwhomithashappenedto,becausethewhomquestioninvites bias.
In principle, empathy could be improved by combining it with (dis)approbationandsomeprocedureforachievingimpartiality.Butoncewehave theseothermechanismsinplace,empathymightprovesuperfluous.Ifwecanlearn toseedistantstrangersasworthyofconcern,andifwebecomeoutragedwhentheir needsareunansweredanddelightedwhenwehelpthem,thenwewillbemotivated act on their behalf. Empathy drops out of the picture. And, on my own recommendation, any focus on the victim of a transgression should be avoided, because of potential bias. If I am right, the most reliable method of achieving impartiality actually involves bracketing off thoughts about victims, and, thus, empathymightactuallybesomethingwewanttoavoid.
Inresponse,theproponentofempathymightsaythatweneedtoempathize with distant others in order to become outraged when they are harmed. But this suggestionisfalseandfutile.It'sfalse,becausewecandirectlyconditioneachother to be outraged at the thought of iniquity, genocide, and neglect. Like other emotions, anger can be learned directly. For example, anger can be conditioned throughimitation.Ifweexpressoutrageatinjustice,ourchildrenwillfeeloutrage at injustice. A focus on empathy, as a means to anger, would be futile because empathyisaresponsedirectedatindividuals,andmanyofthemosturgentmoral eventsinvolvelargenumbersofpeople.Wecannotempathizewithagroup,except byconsideringeachmember.Themagnitudeofsomecatastrophesissolargethatit wouldbeimpossibletoempathizewithallthevictims.And,ifwecouldempathize withalargenumber,theagonyofvicariouspainwouldcrippleusintoinaction.Itis important to remember that death tolls are not just statistics-they involve real people-but empathizing with multitudes of victims is neither possible nor productive. What we really need is an intellectual recognition of our common humanity and combined with a keen sense that human suffering is outrageous. If wecouldcultivatethesetwothings,wewouldachievegreatercommitmenttoglobal welfare.
Idonotwanttosuggestthatweshouldactivelysuppressempathy.Perhaps itenrichesthelivesofthosewhoexperienceit,andperhapsithelpstofosterclose dyadic relations in personal life. But, in the moral domain, we should regard empathy with caution, given empathetic biases, and recognize that it cannot serve thecentralmotivationalroleindrivingprosocialbehavior.Perhapsempathyhasa placeinmorality,butotheremotionsmaybemuchmoreimportant:emotionssuch as guilt and anger. When confronted with moral offenses, it's not enough to commiseratewithvictims.Weshouldgetuppity. 1
